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The notion of “fighting words” was established in the benchmark
case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which chronicled how
Chaplinsky, a proselytizing Jehovah’s witness, called the city
marshal a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned fascist,”
and was convicted for violating a state statute forbidding
individuals from addressing others in an offensive way. The
New Hampshire statute and the Chaplinsky ruling established
a new framework for classifying speech as fighting words,
which are not constitutionally protected speech. For speech to
be considered fighting words, it must satisfy three criteria: The
speech must be individually addressed and incite immediate
violence in an average addressee. This essay explores the
fighting words doctrine as presently constructed, determines that
the criterion regarding an “average addressee” is particularly
problematic, and suggests that the doctrine be altered to include
specific demographics such as race. First, opposing viewpoints
in favor of the current doctrine, including maintaining a
high level of protection of free speech and avoiding issues
regarding content-based speech restrictions, are discussed.
These arguments are rebutted to conclude that the doctrine
has only adverse effects. The latter portion of the essay argues
that the case Miller v. California provides legal precedent for
altering the fighting words doctrine, so that specific contexts
are considered. It also contends that doing so aligns with both
the contemporary social zeitgeist and the state’s key interests.
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Interpreting Fighting Words
Freedom of speech is a key tenet of American society and
government, and restrictions on speech are understandably
hotly contested. Among the various types of speech that are
not constitutionally protected, fighting words cases are the
least prevalent. “Fighting words” are defined as speech that is
individually addressed to an average addressee and would incite
immediate violence towards the person making the speech.
The primary reason that fighting words cases are so rare is
that there is no speech that would be universally regarded as
so heinous that anyone would reasonably expect individuals
to respond violently. Of these criterion, the most problematic
is the second, which specifies an “average addressee.”
For speech to be considered fighting words, it would
have to be universally regarded as so offensive as to incite
violence, regardless of the individual addressee’s identifiable
characteristics. At the time of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in
1942, calling an individual a “God damned racketeer”1 and “a
damned Fascist”2 was considered so offensive as to incite violence
against the speaker, yet today this would not be the case. However,
speech that is biased against a specific demographic, such as
race, could, by today’s standards, understandably be responded
to with violence; still, according to the aforementioned criteria,
the speech would qualify as constitutionally protected. Thus,
the fighting words doctrine – as presently constructed – fails to
establish a class of speech which ought not to be constitutionally
protected. Mainly, it is universally inapplicable to most speech
and simultaneously so narrow in its scope that it fails to
provide a legal standard for the punishment of unconstitutional
speech. Considering these inadequacies as well as prior case
Steven H. Shiffrin and Jesse H. Choper, The First Amendment, Cases–Comments–Questions,
5th Edition (Saint Paul, Minnesota: West Academic Publishing, 2011).
2
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history, contemporary standards, and potential benefits, the
fighting words doctrine should expand its scope by allowing
specific demographics, such as race, to be taken into account.
The Status Quo
Proponents of the fighting words doctrine, notably traditionalists,
assert the importance of maintaining the status quo regarding
fighting words and the current level of constitutional protection
that the doctrine affords to certain speech. As it is, the doctrine
is highly protective of speech, in the sense that it is nearly
impossible to argue that specific speech would satisfy all three
criteria, particularly the criterion which regards an “average
addressee.” Placing further restrictions on fighting words speech
would thus make the speech less protected, and more speech
would likely lose its constitutional protection. This results
in somewhat of a chilling effect. Since the doctrine would
ultimately be less protective of speech, those making speech
such as racial commentary or criticism may fear that their speech
could be conflated or construed as a verbal attack on a racial
demographic. Rather than face potential legal repercussions
for making the speech, an individual may choose to not make
the speech at all. Avoiding this type of self-censorship is a key
interest of the state, as the state – both by law and in practice –
aims to uphold the First Amendment to encourage a “marketplace
of ideas.”3 Referenced in Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams
v. United States, the marketplace of ideas is encapsulated by
the notion that only by competing with other ideas, claims, or
speech can truth be found.4 Essentially, if an expansion in the
scope of the fighting words doctrine leads to a chilling effect,
it is less likely that ideas will be compared and the truth will
be discovered – or that knowledge will be advanced for all.
Another reason that the status quo regarding fighting
3
4

op. cit., fn. 1
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words should be maintained, according to opposing viewpoints,
is that prior case history illustrates that the government cannot
regulate speech based on its specific content. One case that
demonstrates this is R.A.V. v. St. Paul. The U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the decision of lower courts,
ruling that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance was
unconstitutional in its regulation of the content of speech.
Under the ordinance, displaying a symbol or object that
would cause anger or alarm based on demographics such
as race was considered a misdemeanor.5 The issue with the
ordinance, according to Justice Scalia, was its effect: one side
of the debate was being forced to fight under “the Marquis of
Queensbury Rules.”6 In other words, the ordinance essentially
gave one side of a debate regarding demographics like race a
certain advantage. For example, in a debate, minority groups
might have had an advantage because the ordinance targeted
racism, and they would thus have special protections that others
did not. In effect, the government would be biased towards
certain viewpoints – endorsing some while condemning others
– resulting in viewpoint discrimination. Ultimately, further
regulating the content of fighting words speech would also have
the effect of increasing self-censorship, since the government
would establish the primacy of certain viewpoints over others.
Fighting Words and Contemporary Standards
Despite these objections, specific demographics such as race
should be considered under the fighting words doctrine. Prior
cases provide evidence that content-based rulings are both
possible and supported by legal precedent. In Miller v. California,
a Supreme Court case regarding sexually explicit speech, the
Miller Test was established to distinguish between obscene
and non-obscene speech – the former is not constitutionally
5
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protected. Similar to the problematic criterion of the fighting
words doctrine, the first standard of the Miller Test seeks
to determine if an average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find that the work, taken as whole,
appeals to the prurient interest.7 Here is a prime example of
a precedent for rulings which are based upon the meaning
derived from the specific content of a work. The key issue with
the fighting words doctrine is that its scope is so broad that it
has the unfortunate effect of limiting what can be considered
fighting words. If an individual makes a specific racial slur
towards another person, it is reasonable that the addressee
might react violently toward the speaker. However, it is not
necessarily reasonable to expect that someone of a different
racial group would react violently as well. Nevertheless,
under the current fighting words doctrine – though the first
addressee’s actions might be a perfectly reasonable response
– the individual’s speech would be constitutionally protected,
since the racially-targeted speech would not universally result
in violence. Applying the criterion of contemporary community
standards emphasizes the notion that experiences are contextual,
not universal, and recognizes that values and standards
regarding what is offensive may not be or remain the same.
Additionally, the fighting words doctrine should
take specific demographics like race into account due to the
contemporary social climate. As mentioned previously, calling
someone a “God damned racketeer”8 would not, by today’s
social standards, be considered so insulting that someone would
reasonably react violently towards the speaker. It is difficult to
think of many utterances that would incite violence now, likely
due to how the nature of discourse itself has changed. Over
time, language has become both less formal and more callous,
7
8

42

Ibid.
op. cit., fn. 1

43

PAIDEIA VOLUME 5
particularly in comparison to language used at the time of the
Chaplinsky case. As a result of an increase in the prevalence of
vulgar and offensive speech, people have become accustomed and
hardened to it, so that it is less likely that they will react violently
to any language used at all. Language has devolved such that
there is a greater sense of indifference to harmful speech, and the
standard for speech that is offensive enough to provoke violence
has changed. Social movements have also played a role in this
change. Now more than ever are individuals more conscious
about their identity in terms of the unique aspects that define
their character and experience, such as their racial background.
Considering how race is so tied to one’s political, economic,
and social experiences, as well as the historical plight of racial
groups specifically, it is reasonable that it would be so integral
to one’s identity that if one is insulted egregiously based on their
race, they would react towards the speaker with violence. Both
language and individuals’ sense of identity have shifted, and it is
pertinent that the fighting words doctrine be adapted accordingly.
There are also several state interests and benefits in
considering race within the fighting words doctrine. It should
first be noted that there is little, if any, value in fighting words
generally. There is no public utility in sanctioning the exercise
of free speech that exists only to inflame or injure. It follows
then, that there is little to no meaningful value in racially-biased
speech that intends to inflame or injure to the extent that an
addressee will be incited to respond violently. Further, it is a key
interest of the state to promote overarching equality. The state
has a vested interest in limiting free speech which is racially
biased and inflammatory, so that true equality can be pursued.
Considering race within the fighting words doctrine would also
have the effect of supporting state interests in protecting its
citizens and maintaining the peace. If individuals were faced
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with the prospect of legal repercussions for using raciallyinflammatory speech that would incite violence, they would be
less incentivized to make the speech in the first place. Thus,
citizens would be less likely to be harmed, and breaches of the
peace would be less likely to occur. Lastly, reconsidering the
framework of the fighting words doctrine would mean that those
who rightfully deserve legal consequences for inciteful speech
would be punished. Under the current doctrine, which limits the
scope of fighting words speech to what would universally incite
violence, racially-biased inflammatory speech is constitutionally
protected, even though contemporary standards would consider
this speech to be capable of inciting violence. In short, it is in the
state’s interest to alter the scope of the fighting words doctrine.
Objections
One set of possible objections to this argument is that there
is potential danger in placing too much value on the specific
contexts of free speech. An extreme example might be
someone stating: “I don’t believe in God” in a radically
religious community. According to that individual, applying
the community standards of their specific demographic, in
this case, religion, it may be reasonable to expect that people
would respond violently, as such utterances are considered
blasphemous. Most people would argue that any reasonable
person would not react violently to this speech, but the idea of
contemporary community standards that allow room for specific
contexts means that even extreme community standards would
be constitutionally protected. Additionally, in reference to the
devolution of language, it can be argued that the prevalence
of harmful language actually sensitizes individuals rather than
hardens them. As a result, people may become more reckless
when it comes to inflammatory speech, making it more likely
that individuals will react violently to targeted language. Lastly,
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altering the fighting words doctrine might serve the state interest
in maintaining the peace – but this is ultimately outweighed
by the fact that it would result in viewpoint discrimination
and a chilling effect. One side of the debate would be afforded
protections that the other was not, and those fearing legal
punishment would refrain from making any speech at all.
However, these objections are problematic and can be
countered by three contentions. First, it is wholly necessary to
observe the intent of free speech. Regardless of how perverse
a community’s standards may be, the original intent of speech
is preserved when taken in the context of those standards and
remains as a waypoint by which one can gauge if the speech
ought to be constitutionally protected. This follows from the
third criterion of the Miller Test, requiring consideration of the
interest or concern of the work (or in this case, the speech) as
a whole. Second, fighting words have nothing to do with the
presence or absence of violence on the part of the addressee – it
has to do with whether a person’s speech in a specific instance is
constitutionally protected or not. Further, altering the scope of the
doctrine to allow room for more contextual-based analysis means
that even if people are generally more sensitive to marginalizing
language, it will meet community standards. Third, it is once
again necessary to point out that it has been established that
fighting words have little, if any, social value. If there is only
one way of expressing a viewpoint that ultimately serves to
inflame and injure, there is not only no value in the viewpoint,
but the viewpoint can have only negative impacts as well.
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Conclusion
Undoubtedly, there are several issues with the present fighting
words doctrine. Prior case history such as Miller v. California
has demonstrated that it is both possible and beneficial to alter
the doctrine to be more context-based rather than universal –
so that specific demographics such as race can be considered.
Contemporary social understanding indicates that previous
definitions of fighting words are no longer applicable, and that
specific, targeted attacks on a person’s racial identity are among
the only kinds of speech to which a person may reasonably
respond with violence. The state has an interest in altering the
doctrine, as it would support its aims to promote equality and
maintain the peace. Ultimately, expansion of the fighting words
doctrine would function within existing case law and balance the
state’s interest in maintaining a marketplace of ideas in the context
of changing social and cultural norms of acceptable discourse.
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